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1 Introduction
In this paper I consider a market where a fixed number of firms each oﬀer
a product of distinct quality. Production has constant returns to scale, al-
though the firms may have diﬀerent unit costs. Both the product qualities
and unit costs of the firms are fixed exogenously, and they compete through
setting prices simultaneously. Consumers have multiplicative utility func-
tions that are increasing in quality, but they diﬀer in their willingness to
pay for quality. In such a standard setup of a quality-diﬀerentiated industry,
the central question I investigate is the following: When is a firm producing
a higher quality product more (less) profitable at equilibrium? Or equiv-
alently, under what cost-quality conditions in the industry will oﬀering a
higher-quality product imply a competitive (dis)advantage? I consider both
profit and profit margin as alternative indicators of profitability. Profit mar-
gin is essentially a firm’s choice variable due to its one-to-one relationship
to price. Profit margin is of independent interest also because it reflects the
profit made from each unit sold.
In the familiar setting described above, at equilibrium a higher-quality
product must be oﬀered at a higher price (otherwise those products of lower
qualities would not be purchased by any consumer), and products of higher
qualities appeal to consumer segments with higher willingness to pay. If all
firms were to produce at the same level of unit costs, therefore, a firm selling
a higher quality product would naturally have a competitive advantage and
enjoy greater profitability. However, the picture becomes much less clear
when the firms have heterogeneous unit costs, because the profitability of
each firm depends on not only its own cost-quality profile but also those
of the other firms. A major contribution of this paper is to develop two
measures that each index a firm’s productive competency, and identify the
corresponding suﬃcient conditions for producing a higher quality product to
be more (or less) profitable.
The first measure is a firm’s absolute cost eﬃciency, defined as the ratio
2
between its quality level and unit cost. It is an absolute measure in that it is
determined purely with each firm’s own inherent characteristics. I show that
a firm obtains both higher profit and profit margin if it can produce a higher
quality product with an equal or higher absolute cost eﬃciency. This implies
that, if the absolute cost eﬃciency is non-decreasing in quality, profitability
is monotone increasing in quality. However, this measure can not predict the
firms’ profitability when the absolute cost eﬃciency is decreasing.
To address the deficiency of the previous measure, I develop a second
metric which I call the relative cost eﬃciency of a firm. Unlike absolute cost
eﬃciency, a firm’s relative cost eﬃciency takes into account the costs and
product qualities of both the firm itself and its immediate competitor(s).
I show that, when the relative cost eﬃciency increases (decreases) in the
quality levels of the firms, selling a higher-quality product is more (less)
profitable. The cost trajectories that yield monotone increasing profitability
can be concave, convex, or inversed-S-shaped (i.e., first concave and then
convex as quality increases,) and the cost trajectories that yield monotone
decreasing profitability can be convex or S-shaped (i.e., first convex and then
concave as quality increases.)
The above results are obtained based on the assumption that the distrib-
ution of consumer types has a logconcave density. This paper also considers
the special case of a uniform consumer distribution, and arrives at further
results. The lower and upper bounds on each firm’s profit margin are estab-
lished. When the cost trajectory is (locally) concave over some quality range,
the profit of a firm whose product quality is in the interior of this range can
not exceed that of (at least) one of the two firms at the boundary of this
quality range.
In the extant literature, two papers related to the present paper are
Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Gal-Or (1985). In a duopolistic setting,
Shaked and Sutton (1982) focus on demonstrating the existence of and also
characterizing the (sub-game) perfect equilibria in qualities and prices. One
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result of theirs is that the firm choosing a higher quality level makes a higher
profit. Gal-Or (1985) focuses on the impacts of entry on the degree of product
diﬀerentiation and the average quality in the industry. Her model is one of
Cournot competition, where a number of firms compete by choosing qualities
and quantities to produce simultaneously. She derives a similar result that
a firm choosing a higher quality level also obtains a higher profit. There are
two major diﬀerences between these two papers and the current paper. First,
their models assume specific forms of unit cost functions. (Unit cost is zero
in Shaked and Sutton (1982) and a quadratic function of quality in Gal-Or
(1985).) Mine does not. Instead, I seek more general suﬃcient and necessary
conditions for oﬀering a higher-quality product to be more (less) profitable.
Second, quality choices are endogenous in both Shaked and Sutton (1982)
and Gal-Or (1985), but are exogenously given in this paper. Even though
equilibrium quality location is not a central concern of this model, the results
obtained here readily apply once the firms have chosen their quality levels.
My modeling framework is also similar to those of Mussa and Rosen
(1978), Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1980), Shaked and Sutton (1983), and
Itoh (1983). However, these early classics on vertical diﬀerentiation address
issues other than ranking the profitability of firms selling products of diﬀerent
qualities. Furthermore, most of these articles also adopt specific forms of cost
functions. Assuming a strictly convex unit cost function of quality, Mussa
and Rosen (1978) study how a monopolist should price its product line to
discriminate against consumers with heterogeneous willingness to pay. The
unit costs of producing at diﬀerent quality levels are assumed to be zero
in Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1980). Gabszewicz and Thisse (1980) and
Shaked and Sutton (1983) point out an interesting "finiteness" property of
industries characterized with vertical diﬀerentiation (in contrast to horizontal
diﬀerentiation): under certain conditions on the cost function the market
can only sustain a limited number of firms at a Nash price equilibrium,
even in the absence of any fixed costs of entry. In a monopolistic setting
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reminiscent of Mussa and Rosen (1978), Itoh (1983) analyzes how prices of
existing products, and consequently consumer welfare, may be aﬀected by
introduction of a new product (or finer product diﬀerentiation.) Champsaur
and Rochet (1989) extend the Mussa-Rosen model to a duopoly where the
firms oﬀer non-overlapping, continuous spectrums of qualities.
Prices instead of quantities are the firms’ decision variables in the papers
just mentioned, except for Gal-Or (1985). Other Cournot-type models of
vertical diﬀerentiation include Gal-Or (1983), Moorthy (1985), and more
recently, De Fraja (1996) and Johnson and Myatt (2003). The article by
Johnson and Myatt (2003) examine when a multiproduct monopolist may
expand or contract its product line in response to entry. Since the present
paper deals with competition between single-product, price-setting firms, this
stream of papers are not discussed in full detail here.
A model is presented in Section 2. Section 3 contains the core of this
paper. Assuming logconcavity of the consumer distribution, Section 3 first
develops the notion of relative cost eﬃciency and the associated suﬃcient
conditions for a higher-quality product to earn a higher (lower) profit margin.
It then proceeds to show that the absolute cost eﬃciency of a firm is also
a useful measure for its profitability. Section 4 looks at the special case
of a uniform consumer distribution and derives more detailed results. In
particular, the uniform distribution assumption makes it possible to derive
suﬃcient conditions for the equilibrium profits to be monotone in quality.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
There are K firms in this market. Production has constant returns to scale
for all firms, and the quality and cost levels of each firm are exogenously
given. Specifically, firm k produces a good of quality vk at a constant unit cost
ck > 0, and there are no fixed costs of production. The firms compete through
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setting prices simultaneously. I assume that the quality levels of the firms are
all distinct, to avoid trivialities due to the basic Bertrand argument. Without
loss of generality I index the firms so that 0 < v1 < v2 < ... < vK . Each firm
is thus represented by a point (vk, ck) in the quality-cost space. Connecting
each pair of adjacent points (vk−1, ck−1) and (vk, ck) with a straight line would
lead to the "cost trajectory" of this oligopoly. Define
dk =
ck − ck−1
vk − vk−1
, for k = 1, ..., K, (1)
where v0 = c0 = 0. Here v0 is a "virtual" product that costs nothing to
produce. Each dk represents the "slope" of the cost trajectory between vk−1
and vk. Since no restrictions are imposed on the firms’ costs (other than
ck > 0), dk need not be monotonic in k. Therefore, there may be "zigzags"
in the cost trajectory of the oligopoly.
Throughout this paper, a cost trajectory is said to be concave (convex)
if d1 ≥ d2 ≥ ... ≥ dK (d1 ≤ d2 ≤ ... ≤ dK), is S-shaped if it is first convex
and then concave (d1 ≤ ... ≤ dk ≥ ... ≥ dK for some 1 < k < K), and
is inversed-S-shaped if it is first concave and then convex as quality rises
(d1 ≥ ... ≥ dk ≤ ... ≤ dK for some 1 < k < K). A cost trajectory is said
to be locally concave (convex) over a contiguous range of qualities vi, ..., vj if
di ≥ ... ≥ dj+1 (di ≤ ... ≤ dj+1).
Each consumer has a unit demand, i.e., she either purchases precisely
one unit from the products oﬀered or does not purchase. Assume that a con-
sumer’s utility is multiplicatively separable in product quality and her own
type characteristic. Without further loss of generality I adopt the familiar
Mussa-Rosen utility function. A multiplicatively separable utility function
can be transformed into the Mussa-Rosen form through rescaling (cf. Itoh
(1983) and Johnson and Myatt (2003)). Each consumer has a constant mar-
ginal willingness to pay for quality, and a consumer of type θ obtains net
utility θv − p from a product of quality v priced at p. I first derive the
core results of this paper assuming that θ has a logconcave density on [0, 1],
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and then examine the case when θ is uniformly distributed for purposes of
illustration and deriving further results.
Denote the price of firm k as pk. Connecting each pair of adjacent points
(vk−1, pk−1) and (vk, pk) in the quality-price space with a straight line, one
would obtain the "price trajectory" of this oligopoly. Let
θk =
pk − pk−1
vk − vk−1
, for k = 1, ...,K, (2)
where v0 = p0 = 0, i.e., the zero-quality product is a free product with zero
utility for all consumers. Selecting v0 thus amounts to not purchasing at all.
Here θk is the "slope" of the price trajectory between firms k − 1 and
k. A consumer of type θk obtains the same level of net utility from buying
vk−1 and vk, and is therefore indiﬀerent between these two quality levels. A
familiar implication of the Mussa-Rosen utility function is that consumers
between θk and θk+1 (with θK+1 = 1) will prefer product k, while consumers
below θ1 will make no purchase. Therefore, if the firms set prices so that θk
is non-decreasing in k, the demand and profit of firm k are
Dk = F (θk+1)− F (θk) (3)
and
πk = (pk − ck)(F (θk+1)− F (θk)) (4)
respectively. The firms set prices simultaneously to maximize their own prof-
its.
3 The Consumer Distribution has a Logcon-
cave Density
Suppose that the density of consumer types is f(θ) on [0, 1], with
R 1
0
f(θ)dθ =
1. Let F (θ) =
R θ
0
f(x)dx.
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Assumption 1. f(θ) is logconcave and diﬀerentiable on (0, 1).
Many frequently used distributions have logconcave densities, e.g., the
exponential, normal, uniform, and Weibull distributions, among others. By
a result due to Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1991), under Assumption 1 a Nash
equilibrium exists in the pricing game described in the Model section. Caplin
and Nalebuﬀ (1991) consider a more general setting of imperfect competition
that encompasses vertical diﬀerentiation, and show that a log-concave density
of consumer types ensures the existence of price equilibrium.
Apparently, the firms in the present model have no incentive to price
below cost. This paper focuses on the situation where all K firms in the
oligopoly are active at equilibrium, in the sense that each firm attracts strictly
positive demand at a price at or above its unit cost.
The first-order condition (FOC) of firm k (k < K) is
F (θk+1)− F (θk) = (pk − ck)
·
f (θk+1)
vk+1 − vk
+
f (θk)
vk − vk−1
¸
, (5)
where v0 = 0, and the FOC of firm K is
1− F (θK) = (pK − cK)
f (θK)
vK − vK−1
. (6)
Firm k’s FOC equates the marginal benefit to the marginal cost of a unit
increase in its price pk. The LHS of the kth equation above is the demand of
firm k, and represents the profit increase from the consumers who continue to
purchase from firm k after the unit increase in its price. On the other hand,
a unit increase in pk (k < K) also lowers θk+1 by 1/(vk+1 − vk) and raises
θk by 1/(vk− vk−1), thus causing firm k’s initial consumers in the number of
f(θk+1)/(vk+1− vk) and f(θk)/(vk− vk−1) to switch to firms k+1 and k− 1,
respectively. Likewise, a unit increase in pK will cause f(θK)/(vK − vK−1)
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of firm K’s consumers to switch to firm K − 1. The RHS thus stands for
firm k’s profit loss due to lost consumers after the unit price increase. At
equilibrium firm k obtains positive demand as long as pk > ck. Since this
paper assumes that each firm obtains positive sales, at equilibrium θk must be
strictly increasing in k. That is, the equilibrium price trajectory is piecewise
linear, increasing and convex.
Define
G(x, y|α, β) ≡ F (x)− F (y)
αf(x) + βf(y)
, for 0 < y < x < 1 and α, β > 0,
and
H(y|β) ≡ 1− F (y)
βf(y)
, for 0 < y < 1 and β > 0.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1, (1) G(x, y|α, β) is increasing in x and de-
creasing in y, for 0 < y < x < 1; and (2) H(y|β) is non-increasing in y, for
0 < y < 1.
Proof: Under Assumption 1, f(x) > 0 and f 0(x)/f(x) is nonincreasing on
(0, 1). A strictly positive density on the interior of its support implies that
F (x) is strictly increasing on [0, 1].
(1) It is straightforward to verify that
∂
∂x
G(x, y|α, β) > 0
⇐⇒ f(x) [αf(x) + βf(y)]− αf 0(x) [F (x)− F (y)] > 0
⇐⇒ f
0(x)
f(x)
<
αf(x) + βf(y)
α [F (x)− F (y)]
and that
αf(x) + βf(y)
α [F (x)− F (y)] >
f(x)
F (x)
.
Therefore, to show G(x, y|α, β) is increasing in x, we only need to show
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f 0(x)/f(x) ≤ f(x)/F (x), which holds because
f(x)
F (x)
=
R x
0
f 0(z)dzR x
0
f(z)dz
=
R x
0
[f 0(z)/f(z)] f(z)dzR x
0
f(z)dz
≥ f
0(x)
f(x)
.
We can also verify that
∂
∂y
G(x, y|α, β) < 0
⇐⇒ −f(y) [αf(x) + βf(y)]− βf 0(y) [F (x)− F (y)] < 0
⇐⇒ f
0(y)
f(y)
> − αf(x) + βf(y)
β [F (x)− F (y)]
and that
− αf(x) + βf(y)
β [F (x)− F (y)] <
−f(y)
F (x)− F (y) <
−f(y)
1− F (y) .
Therefore, G(x, y|α, β) is decreasing in y if f 0(y)/f(y) ≥ −f(y)/(1 −
F (y)), which follows from
−f(y)
1− F (y) ≤
f(1)− f(y)
1− F (y) =
R 1
y
f 0(z)dzR 1
y
f(z)dz
=
R 1
y
[f 0(z)/f(z)] f(z)dzR 1
y
f(z)dz
≤ f
0(y)
f(y)
.
(2)We can verify thatH
0
(y|β) ≤ 0 if and only if−f2(y)−f 0(y)[1−F (y)] ≤
0, or equivalently f 0(y)/f(y) ≥ −f(y)/(1−F (y)), which holds as just shown
above. Q.E.D.
Let mk = pk − ck and
rk =
1
vk − vk−1
.
Here 1/rk measures the degree of product diﬀerentiation between firm k and
its immediate downstream rival, firm k − 1.
Rewriting (5) and (6) in terms of profit margins mk and rk will greatly
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ease the subsequent analysis. For firms k < K,
F ((mk+1 −mk)rk+1 + dk+1)− F ((mk −mk−1)rk + dk) (7)
= mk[f((mk+1 −mk)rk+1 + dk+1)rk+1 + f((mk −mk−1)rk + dk)rk]
where m0 = v0 = 0, and for firm K,
1− F ((mK −mK−1)rK + dK) = mKf((mK −mK−1)rK + dK)rK . (8)
Proposition 2 identifies a suﬃcient condition for the firms’ profit margins
to be monotone increasing in the qualities of their products.
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1, suppose
m01 ≤ G (d3, d2|r3, r2) ≤ ... ≤ G (dK, dK−1|rK, rK−1) ≤ H (dK|rK) ,
where m01 is the unique solution to m
0
1 = G(d2, d1+m
0
1r1|r2, r1). Then m1 ≤
... ≤ mK.
Proof: First, we show the uniqueness of m01. Let W (m1) = m1. Clearly,
W (m1) is strictly increasing. From Lemma 1, G(d2, d1+m1r1|r2, r1) is strictly
decreasing inm1. The remaining argument to establish the uniqueness of m01
splits into three cases. Case (1): when d2 > d1. At m1 = 0, W (m1) = 0
and G(d2, d1 + m1r1|r2, r1) > 0. At m1 = (d2 − d1)v1, W (m1) > 0 and
G(d2, d1 + m1r1|r2, r1) = 0. Therefore m01 > 0 must be unique. Case (2):
when d2 < d1. At m1 = 0, W (m1) = 0 and G(d2, d1 +m1r1|r2, r1) < 0. At
m1 = (d2 − d1)v1, W (m1) < 0 and G(d2, d1 + m1r1|r2, r1) = 0. Therefore
m01 < 0 must be unique. Case (3): when d2 = d1. In this case, at m1 > 0,
W (m1) > 0 but G(d2, d1 + m1r1|r2, r1) < 0. At m1 < 0, W (m1) < 0 but
G(d2, d1 +m1r1|r2, r1) > 0. Therefore m01 = 0.
The rest of the proof is by induction and has two steps.
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Step 1. We wish to showm1 ≤ m2 under the condition of the Proposition.
Suppose m1 > m2. Then from (7) we have
m1 = G (d2 + (m2 −m1)r2, d1 +m1r1|r2, r1)
< G (d2, d1 +m1r1|r2, r1) , (by Lemma 1)
which implies
m1 < m
0
1.
If d2 ≤ d1, the last inequality implies m1 < 0. A contradiction to m1 > 0
for firm 1 to be active at equilibrium, and thus m1 ≤ m2 must hold.
If d2 > d1, setting k = 2 in (7) gives
m2 = G (d3 + (m3 −m2)r3, d2 + (m2 −m1)r2|r3, r2)
> G (d3 + (m3 −m2)r3, d2|r3, r2) . (by Lemma 1)
Therefore, we have
G (d3 + (m3 −m2)r3, d2|r3, r2)
< m2 < m1 < m
0
1
= G(d2, d1 +m
0
1r1|r2, r1) (by construction)
≤ G (d3, d2|r3, r2) , (by assumption)
or,
G (d3 + (m3 −m2)r3, d2|r3, r2) < G (d3, d2|r3, r2) .
By Lemma 1, the last inequality implies m3 < m2. Similarly, we can show
that when m1 > m2, mk < mk−1 for all successively higher k. That is,
mK < ... < m1 < m
0
1.
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However, mK < mK−1 and (8) jointly imply
mK = H(dK + (mK −mK−1)rK |rK)
≥ H(dK |rK). (by Lemma 1)
We thus have
H(dK |rK) < m01.
A contradiction to the condition of the Proposition. This proves m1 ≤ m2,
completing Step 1.
Step 2. Suppose mk−1 ≤ mk (k < K) holds, and we wish to show mk ≤
mk+1 under the condition of the Proposition. This step is very analogous to
Step 1, and is relegated to the Appendix. Q.E.D.
To see the rationale behind Proposition 2, it is helpful to examine the
economic interpretation of each term in its condition first. The k’th term (1 <
k < K) in the condition of Proposition 2 is [F (dk+1)−F (dk)]/[f(dk+1)rk+1+
f(dk)rk]. Even though this ratio may take negative values (when dk+1 < dk),
for now I only focus on the case when it is positive. The numerator of this
ratio is firm k’s market size if all firms were to price at their unit costs, and
represents the profit increase resulting from a unit price increase by firm k.
The denominator is the number of firm k’s consumers that would be lost to
its competitors due to a unit increase in pk. The magnitude of this ratio
is thus a measure of firm k’s profitability. Note that this term incorporates
both demand- and supply-side factors. In particular, since on the supply side
it takes into account the unit costs and quality levels of both firm k and its
immediate competitors (namely, firms k − 1 and k + 1), this term is called
firm k’s relative cost eﬃciency. The corresponding terms for firms 1 and K
have similar meanings, with the only diﬀerence being that these two firms
each have only one direct competitor.
Proposition 2 may thus be interpreted as follows: When the relative cost
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eﬃciency is increasing in product quality, so are the equilibrium profit mar-
gins of the firms. Such an interpretation becomes much more concrete for
the special case in which consumer types are uniformly distributed.
Corollary 3 Suppose consumer types are uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. If
d2 − d1
2r1 + r2
≤ d3 − d2
r3 + r2
≤ ... ≤ dK − dK−1
rK + rK−1
≤ 1− dK
rK
,
then m1 ≤ m2 ≤ ... ≤ mK.
The kth term (1 < k < K) in the condition of the Corollary is the
change in the slope of the cost trajectory at firm k (dk+1 − dk) multiplied
by a parameter reflecting the degree of product diﬀerentiation between firms
k − 1, k, and k + 1 (1/(rk+1 + rk)). After some algebra, this term can be
rewritten as
dk+1 − dk
rk+1 + rk
=
1
vk+1 − vk−1
[(vk − vk−1)ck+1 + (vk+1 − vk)ck−1]− ck.
The first term in this expression is the quality-weighted average cost of firms
k − 1 and k + 1. Therefore, (dk+1 − dk)/(rk+1 + rk) represents the quality-
weighted cost advantage of firm k relative to the two firms with which it
directly competes. Similarly, (d2 − d1)/(2r1 + r2) reflects firm 1’s quality-
weighted cost advantage relative to firm 2, and (1−dK)/rK reflects firm K’s
cost-quality position relative to firm K − 1.
The condition in Proposition 2 is suﬃcient, but not necessary for a higher
quality product to generate a higher profit margin. For example, a concave
cost trajectory may demonstrate decreasing relative cost eﬃciency (thus vi-
olating the condition in Proposition 2) but always ensures increasing profit
margins (by Proposition 7 below). It is worthwhile pointing out that the
condition in Proposition 2 may be satisfied by concave, convex, or inversed-
S-shaped cost trajectories.
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Proposition 4 Under Assumption 1, suppose
m01 ≥ G (d3, d2|r3, r2) ≥ ... ≥ G (dK, dK−1|rK, rK−1) ≥ H (dK|rK) ,
where m01 is the unique solution to m
0
1 = G(d2, d1+m
0
1r1|r2, r1). Then m1 ≥
... ≥ mK.
Its proof closely parallels that of the previous Proposition, and is omitted.
According to Proposition 4, the profit margins are monotone decreasing in
product quality if each firm oﬀering a successively higher quality product has
a lower relative cost eﬃciency. Note that the condition in Proposition 4 may
be satisfied by convex or S-shaped cost trajectories.
Adding the K FOCs in (7) and (8) gives
1− F (m1r1 + d1) = m1f (m1r1 + d1) r1
+
KX
2
(mk +mk−1)f ((mk −mk−1)rk + dk) rk. (9)
When the firms obtain equal profit margin, i.e., m1 = ... = mK = m∗, (9)
becomes
1− F (m∗r1 + d1) = m∗
Ã
f (m∗r1 + d1) r1 + 2
KX
2
f (dk) rk
!
. (10)
By Lemma 1, m∗ is unique. Here m∗ is the mean profit margin in the
industry. Not surprisingly, m∗ decreases when the products are less diﬀeren-
tiated (i.e., the rk’s are larger) or when the number of firms K increases.
Proposition 5 Under Assumption 1, a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for m1 = ... = mK = m∗ is
m01 = G (d3, d2|r3, r2) = ... = G (dK, dK−1|rK , rK−1) = H (dK |rK) ,
where m01 is the unique solution to m
0
1 = G(d2, d1 +m
0
1r1|r2, r1).
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Proof: (1)Suﬃciency. Since the condition of the Proposition satisfies
those in both Propositions 2 and 4, we have m1 ≤ ... ≤ mK and m1 ≥ ... ≥
mK , and hence m1 = ... = mK = m∗.
(2)Necessity. Suppose m1 = ... = mK = m∗. Then the system of FOCs
in (7) and (8) reduces to
m∗ = G(d2, d1 +m
∗r1|r2, r1),
m∗ = G(dk+1, dk|rk+1, rk), for 1 < k < K,
and
m∗ = H(dK |rK).
The desired set of conditions then follows by noting that m∗ = m01.
Q.E.D.
When the firms obtain equal profit margin, the cost trajectory of the
oligopoly must be increasing and convex. It is readily verified that, when
m1 = ... = mK = m
∗, the equilibrium demands of the firms are D1 =
F (d2)− F (m∗r1 + d1), Dk = F (dk+1)− F (dk) (for 1 < k < K), and DK =
1− F (dK).
Next, I proceed to show that the ratio between a firm’s quality level and its
unit cost (vk/ck) is also a useful measure for its profitability. The ratio vk/ck
is called firm k’s absolute cost eﬃciency in quality provision. Proposition 6
below says that a firm capable of producing a higher quality product at a
higher absolute cost eﬃciency earns a higher profit.
Proposition 6 If ci/vi ≥ cj/vj for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ K, then mi < mj and
πi < πj.
Proof: Suppose (p1, ..., pK) is the unique price equilibrium. This means,
when the remainingK−1 firms price at (p1, ..., pj−1, pj+1, ..., pK), firm j’s best
choice is pj. Recall that when all K firms are active, the equilibrium price
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trajectory is a piecewise linear, increasing, and convex function of quality,
i.e., θk < θk+1, for k < K. This implies (pj − pi)/(vj − vi) > pi/vi.
Note that the condition of the Proposition is equivalent to ci/vi ≥ (cj −
ci)/(vj−vi). Since pi/vi > ci/vi, we have (pj−pi)/(vj−vi) > (cj−ci)/(vj−vi),
or equivalently mi < mj. Note that firm j has the option to lower its price
to p0j = cj +mi. Because
p0j − pi
vj − vi
=
cj − ci
vj − vi
≤ ci
vi
<
pi
vi
,
at price p0j firm j would take over the entire demand of firms i, ..., j− 1 (plus
possibly the demand of some other firms). Therefore, at price p0j firm j’s
profit would clearly exceed firm i’s equilibrium profit πi. However p0j is a
price firm j does not choose. Therefore we must have πi < πj. Q.E.D.
The two firms compared in Proposition 6 need not be directly compet-
ing. The key argument in the proof above is the following. Because the
equilibrium price trajectory is increasing and convex, under the condition of
the Proposition, firm j (the firm oﬀering a higher quality) always obtains a
higher profit margin than firm i, i.e., mj > mi. If firm j chose to price at
cj +mi it could have attracted away the entire demand of firm i and thus
made a profit exceeding firm i’s equilibrium profit. However firm j does not
choose such a price. Therefore, firm j’s equilibrium profit must be higher
than that of firm i.
Proposition 7 Suppose c1/v1 ≥ c2/v2 ≥ ... ≥ cK/vK. Then m1 < ... < mK
and π1 < ... < πK.
Proposition 7 is an immediate corollary of Proposition 6. Since the proof
of Proposition 6 does not depend on the logconcavity assumption (Assump-
tion 1), these two Propositions hold for more general classes of consumer dis-
tributions. Since c1/v1 ≥ c2/v2 ≥ ... ≥ cK/vK is equivalent to v1/c1 ≤ v2/c2
≤ ... ≤ vK/cK , Proposition 7 says that when the absolute cost eﬃciency
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does not decrease as quality rises, firms selling higher quality products al-
ways make strictly greater profits. A cost trajectory that demonstrates non-
decreasing absolute cost eﬃciency may embody arbitrary curvatures, except
that it can not be strictly convex (where the absolute cost eﬃciency is de-
creasing). In particular, a concave cost trajectory (d1 ≥ d2... ≥ dK) always
has non-decreasing absolute cost eﬃciency.
4 The Consumer Distribution is Uniform: a
Special Case
This Section examines the uniform consumer distribution as a special case
of distributions with logconcave densities.
Assumption 2. Consumer types are uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
Henceforward, Assumption 2 replaces Assumption 1. Under Assumption
2, the first order conditions in (5) and (6) reduce to
θk+1 − θk = (pk − ck)(rk+1 + rk), for k ≤ K − 1, (11)
1− θK = (pK − cK)rK , for k = K, (12)
and (7) and (8) now become: For k < K,
(mk+1 −mk)rk+1 = (mk −mk−1)rk +mk(rk+1 + rk)− (dk+1 − dk), (13)
0 = (mK −mK−1)rK +mKrK − (1− dK). (14)
As seen in Section 3, Propositions 2, 4 and 5 have their apparent coun-
terparts in the setting of a uniform distribution (cf. Corollary 3), which have
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more intuitive economic interpretations. Here I only deal with a necessary
condition of monotone profit margins, which involves a set of bounds of each
firm’s profit margin.
Proposition 8 Under Assumption 2, suppose m1 S m2 S ... S mK at
equilibrium. Then for 1 ≤ k ≤ K,
dk+1 − d1
2
Pk
1 ri + rk+1
S mk S
1− dk
rk + 2
PK
k+1 ri
.
Proof: The proof is done only for the case in which m1 ≤ ... ≤ mK , the
other case being analogous.
Adding the FOCs of firms 1, ..., k in (13) and (14) gives
(mk+1 −mk)rk+1 = m1r1 +
kX
1
mi(ri+1 + ri)− (dk+1 − d1) ≥ 0,
from which the lower bound ofmk follows. Adding the FOCs of firms k, ...,K
in (13) and (14) and slightly rearranging, we have
K−1X
k
mi(ri+1 + ri) +mKrK = 1− dk − (mk −mk−1)rk ≤ 1− dk.
The upper bound of mk then follows from this inequality. Q.E.D.
So far, I have primarily focused on profit margins as a measure of firms’
per-unit profitability. Next, I will turn to profits, and identify suﬃcient
conditions under which a firm oﬀering a higher quality product makes a
higher (lower) profit.
The first step is to translate the first-order conditions into expressions of
firms’ profits, instead of profit margins. From (11) and (12), at equilibrium
firm k’s demand and profit are Dk = mk(rk+1 + rk) and πk = m2k(rk+1 + rk),
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respectively, where rK+1 = 0. Therefore,
mk =
r
πk
rk+1 + rk
, where rK+1 = 0. (15)
With (15), the system of FOCs in (13) and (14) can be rewritten in terms
of πk:
rk+1
r
πk+1
rk+2 + rk+1
= 2
p
(rk+1 + rk)πk − rk
r
πk−1
rk + rk−1
− (dk+1 − dk), (16)
for firms k ≤ K − 1, where π0 = 0 and r0 = 0, and
0 = 2
√
rKπK − rK
r
πK−1
rK + rK−1
− (1− dK), for firm K. (17)
Equations (16)-(17) allow direct manipulation of firms’ profits, and are
the basis for deriving the next Proposition.
Let
t1 ≡ 2
√
r2 + r1 −
r2√
r3 + r2
,
tk ≡ 2
√
rk+1 + rk −
rk√
rk + rk−1
− rk+1√
rk+2 + rk+1
,
for 1 < k < K, where rK+1 = 0, and
tK ≡ 2
√
rK −
rK√
rK + rK−1
.
Lemma 9
√
rk+1 + rk >
rk√
rk + rk−1
, for 2 ≤ k ≤ K − 1,
√
rk+1 + rk >
rk+1√
rk+2 + rk+1
, for 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1.
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Proof: See Appendix A2.
An immediate implication of Lemma 9 is that tk > 0, 1 ≤ k < K. That
tK > 0 is obvious. Just like rk, each tk measures the degree of diﬀerentiation
between firm k’s product vk and those of its neighboring firms, except that
tk takes into account the qualities of up to two (instead of one) firms below
and above vk.
As the next Proposition shows, when (dk+1 − dk)/tk (with dK+1 = 1) is
monotone in k, so is equilibrium profit πk.
Proposition 10 Under Assumption 2, if
d2 − d1
t1
S ... S dK − dK−1
tK−1
S 1− dK
tK
,
then π1 S ... S πK.
Proof: See Appendix A3.
Even though its composition is too complex to allow a direct interpre-
tation, each term in the condition of the Proposition ((dk+1 − dk)/tk) may
still be viewed as a measure of firm k’s relative cost eﬃciency, because it
takes into consideration the costs and qualities of both firm k itself and its
adjacent competing firms. When a firm can produce a higher quality product
more eﬃciently according to this measure, it also obtains greater profit at
equilibrium.
Under Assumption 2, (9) may also be rewritten (with (15)) as
1− d1 = r1
r
π1
r2 + r1
+
K−1X
1
p
πk(rk+1 + rk) +
√
πKrK . (18)
If all K firms earn the same level of profit, π∗ say, then (18) leads to
√
π∗ =
1− d1
M
, (19)
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where
M =
r1√
r2 + r1
+
K−1X
1
√
rk+1 + rk +
√
rK.
A necessary and suﬃcient condition for the firms to attain the same level
of profit is that their relative cost eﬃciencies ((dk+1 − dk)/tk) are equal.
Proposition 11 Under Assumption 2, the K firms obtain equal profit at
equilibrium if and only if
dk+1 − dk =
√
π∗ · tk, for 1 ≤ k ≤ K.
Proof: (Necessity) Suppose that all K firms have the same profit. Then
as shown above, this common profit level π∗ is as given in (19). Setting
πk = π
∗ in (16)-(17) and slightly rearranging yield the desired conditions.
(Suﬃciency) Suppose the condition of the Proposition holds. The previ-
ous Proposition immediately lead to π1 = ... = πK. The common profit level
π∗ then follows from (19). Q.E.D.
Proposition 12 Suppose di ≥ di+1 ≥ ... ≥ dj, for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ K. Then
either πk < πi−1 or πk < πj, for i ≤ k ≤ j − 1.
Proof: The proof critically relies on the following claim.
Claim 1: Suppose dk ≥ dk+1, for 1 < k < K. Then either πk < πk−1 or
πk < πk+1.
Proof of Claim 1: Suppose πk ≥ πk−1 and πk ≥ πk+1. We then have
rk+1
r
πk
rk+2 + rk+1
≥ rk+1
r
πk+1
rk+2 + rk+1
= 2
p
(rk+1 + rk)πk − rk
r
πk−1
rk + rk−1
− (dk+1 − dk)
≥ 2
p
(rk+1 + rk)πk − rk
r
πk
rk + rk−1
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where the equality is due to (16). This implies
2
√
rk+1 + rk ≤
rk√
rk + rk−1
+
rk+1√
rk+2 + rk+1
,
which contradicts Lemma 9. Therefore either πk < πk−1 or πk < πk+1 must
hold. This completes the proof of Claim 1.
When j = i+ 1, the Proposition reduces to Claim 1.
When j > i+1, suppose there exists some i ≤ k ≤ j−1 so that πk ≥ πi−1
and πk ≥ πj. By Claim 1, either πk < πk−1 or πk < πk+1 holds. If πk < πk−1,
then πk−1 < πk−2 must hold due to the Claim. Repeatedly applying Claim
1 leads to πk < πk−1 < ... < πi−1, contradicting πk ≥ πi−1. Similarly, if
πk < πk+1, one can show that πk < πk+1 < ... < πj. Again, this contradicts
πk ≥ πj. Therefore either πk < πi−1 or πk < πj must hold for i ≤ k ≤ j − 1.
This completes the proof. Q.E.D.
According to Proposition 12, if the cost trajectory is locally concave over
a contiguous range of products vi, ..., vj−1, then each firm within this quality
range earns strictly less profit than (at least) one of the two firms at the
boundary of this quality range (namely, firms i − 1 and j.) Two special
cases of Proposition 12 are as follows. First, if the cost trajectory is kinked
upwards at firm k (i.e., dk ≥ dk+1), then firm k’s profit is exceeded by that of
firm k− 1 or k+1 (cf. Claim 1 in the above proof.) Second, when i = 1 and
j = K (i.e., when d1 ≥ ... ≥ dK), Proposition 12 predicts that π1 < ... < πK
since π0 = 0. As one may recall, this point was also implied by Proposition
7.
The next Lemma gives a set of lower and upper bounds on the consumer
types who are indiﬀerent between each pair of adjacent qualities at equilib-
rium.
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Lemma 13 At equilibrium, the indiﬀerent consumers θk (1 ≤ k ≤ K) sat-
isfy
1
2
(d1 + dk) ≡ lk < θk < uk ≡
1
2K−k+1
+
KX
i=k
1
2i−k+1
di.
Proof: See Appendix A4.
Lemma 13 then implies the following bounds on the equilibrium profit
margins.
Proposition 14 At equilibrium,
max
µ
0,
dk+1 − dk
2(rk+1 + rk)
¶
< mk <
uk+1 − lk
rk
,
where rK+1 = 0 and uK+1 = 1.
Proof: The proof uses the fact that at equilibriummk(rk+1+rk) = θk+1−
θk, where rK+1 = 0 and θK+1 = 1 (from (11), (12)). The upper bound of mk
then follows directly from Lemma 13. Part I of the proof of Lemma 13 (see
Appendix A4) also shows that θk+1 − θk > (1/2)(dk+1 − dk). This leads to
the lower bound of mk. Q.E.D.
From Proposition 14 one can readily derive the corresponding bounds on
firms’ profits, since πk = m2k(rk+1 + rk).
5 Concluding Remarks
The analysis in this paper has heavily utilized the structure of the FOCs.
Each firm’s FOC describes the equilibrium relationship between its own
strategic choice (price, or equivalently profit margin) and those of its imme-
diate competitor(s), reflecting the nature of localized competition in vertical
diﬀerentiation. In Section 3, such a structure of the FOCs together with a
logconcave density of consumer types makes it possible to compare the profit
margins between each pair of firms oﬀering adjacent quality levels. In Section
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4, the system of FOCs and a uniform consumer distribution enable compar-
ison of the profits of two directly competing firms. A key technique of this
analysis is to make a connection between the slopes of the cost trajectory
and those of the equilibrium price trajectory.
When firms produce goods of distinct qualities at potentially diﬀerent
unit costs, this paper has identified two useful measures of a firm’s prof-
itability, namely its absolute and relative cost eﬃciencies, and the associated
suﬃcient conditions for selling a higher-quality product to be more (or less)
profitable. Perhaps the most interesting results obtained are the following.
First, the monotonicity of the relative cost eﬃciency implies that of profit
margins (Propositions 2, 4, 5). Second, when consumer types are uniformly
distributed, this paper has also provided suﬃcient conditions for the equi-
librium profits to be monotone in quality as well as bounds on each firm’s
profitability.
6 Appendix
A1. Step 2 in the proof of Proposition 2.
Suppose mk−1 ≤ mk (k < K) holds, and we wish to show mk ≤ mk+1
under the condition of the Proposition.
Suppose mk > mk+1 instead. From (7), we have
mk = G (dk+1 + (mk+1 −mk)rk+1, dk + (mk −mk−1)rk|rk+1, rk)
< G (dk+1, dk|rk+1, rk) . (by Lemma 1) (20)
If dk ≥ dk+1, (20) is already a contradiction to mk > 0, and thus mk ≤
mk+1 must hold. Otherwise, replacing k with k + 1 in (7) gives
mk+1 = G (dk+2 + (mk+2 −mk+1)rk+2, dk+1 + (mk+1 −mk)rk+1|rk+2, rk+1)
> G (dk+2 + (mk+2 −mk+1)rk+2, dk+1|rk+2, rk+1) . (by Lemma 1)
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We then have
G (dk+2 + (mk+2 −mk+1)rk+2, dk+1|rk+2, rk+1)
< mk+1 < mk
< G (dk+1, dk|rk+1, rk)
≤ G (dk+2, dk+1|rk+2, rk+1) ,
where the last inequality follows from the condition of the Proposition.
Therefore,
G (dk+2 + (mk+2 −mk+1)rk+2, dk+1|rk+2, rk+1) < G (dk+2, dk+1|rk+2, rk+1) ,
which implies mk+1 > mk+2 by Lemma 1. Similarly, we can show that when
mk > mk+1,
mK < ... < mk < G (dk+1, dk|rk+1, rk) .
Again, mK < mK−1 and (8) jointly imply
mK = H(dK + (mK −mK−1)rK |rK) ≥ H(dK |rK).
We thus have
H(dK|rK) < G (dk+1, dk|rk+1, rk) .
A contradiction to the condition of the Proposition. This shows that when
mk−1 ≤ mk (k < K), mk > mk+1 can never hold, and therefore, we must
have mk ≤ mk+1 under the condition of the Proposition.
This completes Step 2 of the proof of Proposition 2.
A2. Proof of Lemma 9.
26
Proof : When 2 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, the first statement follows from
√
rk+1 + rk −
rk√
rk + rk−1
=
1√
vk − vk−1
µr
vk+1 − vk−1
vk+1 − vk
−
r
vk−1 − vk−2
vk − vk−2
¶
> 0,
because the first (second) term in the bracket is strictly greater (less) than
1.
The second statement of the lemma can be shown similarly. Q.E.D.
A3. Proof of Proposition 10.
Proof. We prove the Proposition only for the case in which
d2 − d1
t1
≤ ... ≤ dK − dK−1
tK−1
≤ 1− dK
tK
.
The other case is analogous. The proof is by induction.
Step 1. We wish to show π1 ≤ π2 under the above condition.
Suppose π1 > π2. Then (16) gives
√
π1 <
d2 − d1
t1
. (21)
If d2 ≤ d1, (21) is already a contradiction, and thus π1 ≤ π2 must hold.
Otherwise, we aim to show πK < ... < π2 < π1 when π1 > π2. Suppose
π3 ≥ π2. Then from (16) we have
r3
r
π2
r4 + r3
≤ r3
r
π3
r4 + r3
= 2
p
(r3 + r2)π2 − r2
r
π1
r2 + r1
− (d3 − d2)
< 2
p
(r3 + r2)π2 − r2
r
π2
r2 + r1
− (d3 − d2),
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which leads to
√
π2 >
d3 − d2
t2
.
This and (21) jointly imply
d3 − d2
t2
<
d2 − d1
t1
,
contradicting the condition of the Proposition. Therefore we must have π3 <
π2.
Similarly, when π1 > π2, we can show πk < πk−1 for successively higher
k. That is, under the supposition that π1 > π2,
√
πK < ... <
√
π1 <
d2 − d1
t1
.
Note that πK < πK−1 and (17) jointly imply
1− dK < (2
√
rK − rK
s
1
rK + rK−1
)
√
πK
or equivalently
√
πK >
1− dK
tK
.
We thus have
1− dK
tK
<
d2 − d1
t1
.
A contradiction to the condition of the Proposition. Therefore π1 > π2 can
not hold. This establishes π1 ≤ π2, completing step 1.
Step 2. Suppose πk−1 ≤ πk (k < K) holds, and we wish to show πk ≤ πk+1
under the condition of the Proposition.
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Suppose πk > πk+1. Then from (16) we have
rk+1
r
πk
rk+2 + rk+1
> rk+1
r
πk+1
rk+2 + rk+1
= 2
p
(rk+1 + rk)πk − rk
r
πk−1
rk + rk−1
− (dk+1 − dk)
≥ 2
p
(rk+1 + rk)πk − rk
r
πk
rk + rk−1
− (dk+1 − dk),
which gives
√
πk <
dk+1 − dk
tk
. (22)
If d2 ≤ d1, (22) is already a contradiction, and thus πk ≤ πk+1 must hold.
Otherwise, we aim to show that πK < ... < πk when πk > πk+1. If
πk+2 ≥ πk+1, then it follows from the FOC of firm k + 1 (replacing k with
k + 1 in (16)) that
rk+2
r
πk+1
rk+3 + rk+2
≤ rk+2
r
πk+2
rk+3 + rk+2
= 2
p
(rk+2 + rk+1)πk+1 − rk+1
r
πk
rk+1 + rk
− (dk+2 − dk+1)
< 2
p
(rk+2 + rk+1)πk+1 − rk+1
r
πk+1
rk+1 + rk
− (dk+2 − dk+1),
or
√
πk+1 >
dk+2 − dk+1
tk+1
.
This and (22) above jointly imply
dk+2 − dk+1
tk+1
<
dk+1 − dk
tk
.
A contradiction to the condition of the Proposition. Therefore when πk >
πk+1 we must have πk+2 < πk+1.
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Similarly we can show that when πk > πk+1,
√
πK < ... <
√
πk <
dk+1 − dk
tk
.
However, πK < πK−1 and (17) jointly imply
√
πK >
1− dK
tK
.
Therefore,
1− dK
tK
<
dk+1 − dk
tk
.
A contradiction to the condition of the Proposition. Therefore πk > πk+1
can not hold.
We have shown that πk−1 ≤ πk (k < K) implies πk ≤ πk+1 in Step 2.
This completes the proof of the Proposition. Q.E.D.
A4. Proof of Lemma 13.
Proof : The proof is divided into two parts. In Part I (II), we establish
the lower (upper) bounds on mk.
Part I: Lower bounds. For 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, at equilibrium we have
θk+1 − θk = (pk − ck)
µ
1
vk+1 − vk
+
1
vk − vk−1
¶
(from (11))
or equivalently
(pk+1 − ck)− (pk − ck)
vk+1 − vk
−(pk − ck) + (ck − pk−1)
vk − vk−1
= (pk−ck)
µ
1
vk+1 − vk
+
1
vk − vk−1
¶
.
Rearranging terms, we have
(pk − ck)
µ
1
vk+1 − vk
+
1
vk − vk−1
¶
=
1
2
µ
pk+1 − ck
vk+1 − vk
− ck − pk−1
vk − vk−1
¶
.
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Therefore,
θk+1 − θk =
1
2
µ
pk+1 − ck
vk+1 − vk
− ck − pk−1
vk − vk−1
¶
>
1
2
µ
ck+1 − ck
vk+1 − vk
− ck − ck−1
vk − vk−1
¶
(since pi > ci)
=
1
2
(dk+1 − dk),
or
θk+1 > θk +
1
2
(dk+1 − dk),
Since θ1 > l1 ≡ d1 holds trivially (due to p1 > c1), the lower bounds of
the remaining θk’s are then derived by induction for successively higher k:
θk > lk ≡
1
2
(d1 + dk), for 2 ≤ k ≤ K.
Part II: Upper bounds. From (12), we have
1− θK = (pK − cK)
1
vK − vK−1
= [(pK − pK−1) + (pK−1 − cK)]
1
vK − vK−1
> θK +
cK−1 − cK
vK − vK−1
(since pK−1 > cK−1)
= θK − dK.
Therefore,
θK < uK ≡
1
2
(1 + dK).
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Similarly, for 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, we have (from (11))
θk+1 − θk = (pk − ck)
µ
1
vk+1 − vk
+
1
vk − vk−1
¶
> (pk − pk−1 + pk−1 − ck)
1
vk − vk−1
> θk − dk,
from which the upper bounds of the remaining θk’s are established recursively
for successively lower k:
θk <
1
2
(dk + θk+1) < uk ≡
1
2
(dk + uk+1),
where uk may be rewritten as
uk ≡
1
2K−k+1
+
KX
i=k
1
2i−k+1
di.
This completes the proof of the Lemma. Q.E.D.
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